You know him, you love him. It’s FanGraphs writer Michael Baumann’s fifth time appearing to assess the state of labor in baseball, which this year features a macro-analysis of the minor league CBA, a final consensus on whether deferred money in player contracts matters all that much, and predictions over whether streaming’s collapse will have adverse effects on labor in the future.
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Songs featured in this episode:
Desaparecidos— “Mall of America” • Booker T & the M.G.’s — “Green Onions”
Transcript
Tell us a little bit about what you saw and be able to relay that message to Cora when you watch Kimbrel pitch and kind of help out so he wasn’t typical pitches. So tipping pitches we hear about it all the time. People are home on the stand what tipping pitches all about? That’s amazing. That’s remarkable.
BOBBY: Alex, we’re doing something very special today. It’s the Tipping Pitches 5th Annual State of Labor in Baseball 2024, a year that I’m not sure that our guests ever really contemplated getting to, you know?
ALEX: Yeah.
BOBBY: Wasn’t really ever looking that far in the future, were you, Mike?
ALEX: Nope.
MIKE: I was so certain I would be dead by now.
BOBBY: Well, I’m glad you’re not, because you have to be here—
MIKE: Yeah.
BOBBY: —providing free labor for us, analyzing the industry.
MIKE: Happy to be here, pissed to be alive.
BOBBY: That kind of encapsulates your energy really well, I think.
MIKE: I know.
BOBBY: You make that— may make that your Twitter bio. Hello, sir. It’s good to see you. It’s been a— it’s been a minute since we chatted.
MIKE: Yeah, I missed you. Were— we you back in town for Christmas? I guess I wasn’t here for Christmas. We’re going to talk about this— this in a rant, but— yeah.
BOBBY: I was back in town for Christmas. You know, Philadelphia around the holidays, It’s exactly the same as the rest of the year. People still don’t give a shit about life.
MIKE: Yeah. And one thing I miss about with climate change, you don’t get that beautiful Christmas slush.
BOBBY: Yeah, true.
MIKE: I just remember the— the ShopRite parking lot of my youth just being covered in piles of gray sludge from [1:38]
BOBBY: People don’t know about ShopRite. They don’t know shit about ShopRite. Alex, you don’t know about ShopRite. You don’t even know what that is. Look at you. You don’t know.
ALEX: That’s true. A deer in headlights over here.
BOBBY: Did you get snow on Christmas this year, Alex, in Chicago?
ALEX: No, we got on New Year’s, though. So—
BOBBY: That’s— yeah. Yeah.
ALEX: Not— that doesn’t really count, but—
BOBBY: Yeah, it’s not— the spirit of New Year’s, they don’t really say that. And it’s not really a thing.
ALEX: No.
BOBBY: Mike, five years of this, five years of covering labor in baseball, how’s that make you feel?
ALEX: You were a
BOBBY: A little— a cheeky amount of old or— or [2:08]
MIKE: It makes me— man, I feel so old now. I would say mostly it makes me feel proud of how far you’ve come, Bobby, because I feel like I’ve raised you from a cub. You were just an embryo when we first started podcasting together, and— and look at you now.
BOBBY: What do you think is the— the number one thing that you’ve given me that you still see? The tool that you gave me that I’ve nurtured the most?
MIKE: I just think the confidence to really move up from our— you know, I really showed you the ropes on our little rinky-dink baseball show and now, you’re—
BOBBY: Right.
MIKE: —you know, basically part of the— part of the headlining act of the big picture. You know, name in lights, all this— you know?
BOBBY: You know what I have taken in life from you, Mike?
MIKE: What is that?
BOBBY: A healthy skepticism towards everyone with any shred of power. And that’s what we’re here to talk about.
MIKE: Yeah.
ALEX: Hmm.
BOBBY: How are you feeling about labor in baseball? We are two years removed from a lockout.
MIKE: Yeah.
BOBBY: Only one year removed from actually receiving the CBA document that ended that lockout in— for public consumption. And we’re at what, I guess, we would call the traditional labor piece, but what— what— what does that mean to you? Do you— do you believe in the concept of labor peace? How are you feeling about the state of labor in baseball?
MIKE: No. I— well, I don’t know that I necessarily— there is no peace without total victory, I think. So absent global proletarian revolution, we’re all in a state of— of conflict to—
ALEX: God, he’s so back.
BOBBY: He’s so back.
ALEX: He’s locked in.
BOBBY: The fastball is clocking in.
MIKE: But there are different intensities of conflict, and I feel comfortable with the level of, I would say, relatively low intensity of— of baseball labor conflict. This is definitely, I think, the lowest ebb of intensity in the conflict between players and management. Certainly, since you and I’ve been talking about baseball together, yeah, maybe— I don’t know, maybe 15, 20 years, because, you know, we’ve got— we had the lockout. I think everybody on both sides of the table really needed to see a work stoppage in order to break that— that wall of tension, that everybody was so afraid of the strike. And now, you know, now that we’ve got that out of the way, I think we can deal a little bit more frankly, a little bit less, like, high-mindedly now that the— now that we’ve all lived through a work stoppage. The Minor Leagues are unionized, which was—
ALEX: That’s right.
MIKE: I know— you know, I still have my T-shirt, but I haven’t had to wear it in— in the past year. So, you know— because—
BOBBY: Put it out to pasture.
MIKE: Because they have— I might— I might make it into a pillow, might sew up the— the— the arms and leaves and make it a bod— I was about to say a body pillow, might be a Bobby pillow, but—
BOBBY: Boo. But also good.
ALEX: Wow.
BOBBY: Well done. Well, I’ve missed that. I’ve missed the puns. You know, I haven’t enough punning in podcasts anymore.
MIKE: So every— so what I was— what I was building up to is that, yes, everything is good now, or at least everything is stable. But the success of every labor movement rests on, yes, appreciating your victories and, you know, knowing when you’ve— when you’ve done well, and, you know, being able to really sell when you accomplish something. But you’re also constantly looking ahead to the next fight. And this is something that I think sports unions have had kind of a hit or miss record on. Here, we’re going outside baseball a little bit, but you have to gear up for— for the next thing. And so, you know, we’re seeing, I would say, freer free agent spending than— than we were maybe five years ago. I think that— that immediately— like that immediate glut, either side of the lockout really helped sort of reset some of those higher level salaries. But I could see some more trouble brewing based on— we’ll probably talk about the Ohtani contract and the deferrals, and what that means for— for the market. That’s like the— the big thing that I think is in terms of the stuff that’s in the news right now. And then there’s— we talked about state of labor in baseball, there’s the amateur side with NIL and the— the college game. And— and, I don’t know, there are some interesting— there’s something that happened in the— with regard to the NHL Draft in the past week that, I don’t know, if you bid on, but I’m— I want to bring up and sort of talk to you guys about how that might apply to baseball. So not as busy as it has been, but— but this affords us to sort of have the opportunity to take a step back.
BOBBY: I feel as though we have a little bit of a buffet with all the topics that Baumann just— just laid out there and all of the ones—
ALEX: I know.
BOBBY: —that you and I shared before we started recording this podcast, Alex. But your— your plate is empty, where do we go first? What— what station are we stopping at first?
ALEX: Well, I mean, I— I almost feel like we should get Ohtani out of the way, because I— I’m really curious to kind of hear your perspective on this. I know Bobby is as well, because it caught, I think, just about everyone off guard, the structure of it, the— the extremely large number. Obviously, the crazy amount of money that’s deferred. And I guess, like, I kind of want to start with, like, how much you care about that? Like— like from the perspective of like a fan, like, does— what the Dodgers are doing with his contract kind of matter to you and what sort of precedent, if any, do you think it sets? Because I— there was a lot of sort of hand-wringing in the wake of it, right? What is this going to mean for the free agent market? And then— and then we just kind of moved on, right? Because he’s such a unique player, and he’s the— the only kind of player that can sort of garner that— that sort of thing. So I’m curious to hear your— your perspective on it.
MIKE: Well, I think you really hit the nail on the head there by saying we moved on because he’s unique. And this is— you know, what I’ve been asked about this. I did a couple radio hits and, you know, obviously, wrote about this a few times. I would hesitate to use anything with Ohtani as a precedent because, you know, until they start liking— letting Jake Cronenworth pitch again, there’s nobody [7:59]
BOBBY: Cowards. Cowards.
MIKE: And so— and he’s such an unusual public figure as well, that I don’t know how much what he does applies to everybody else. So in term— and also in terms of the deferrals, this is something that— you know, I’m not the only person who’s saying this, but any other team could do this and it’s— but I think the important thing to remember with the deferrals is that it lowers the practical value of the contract. Like, the reason it counts less against the competitive balance tax is getting your money later makes your money effectively worth less. And so my big question with Ohtani is not the deferrals. I think— I would say like I hope everybody’s sort of briefed on like, “This is not $700 million. This is closer to 460 million.” But there— you know, there are deferrals in the Teoscar Hernández deal. There are deferrals in the Mookie Betts deal. There are deferrals in the Freddie Freeman deal. This is something that Todd Boehly who’s in the Dodgers management group— or ownership group. Now, it’s Chelsea in the Premier League. They’re doing a lot of this very long contracts to sort of amortize the value of— of transfer fees. So to do some sort of this creative accounting, we get around their what they call financial fair play roles in soccer. So this is just sort of a Dodgers MO, and I think the— the important thing is that everybody is— is— understands that this is not for all practical— you know, practical purposes. This is literally 7— $700 million, but it’s not practically $700 million. And I think, you know, players, agents, GMs, they’re all on the same page about that. So as long as everybody’s going in— into this with their eyes open, I don’t really care, you know, whether Shohei Ohtani himself gets $460 million from the Dodgers or $700 million, or something in between. I’m curious what this means— the— my biggest thing is, does this put a de facto cap on earnings for other players coming up behind him? And I think this is going to be less of a problem than it would have been just because a lot of the— the big stars like— there’s nobody like Ohtani, there’s nobody like trout. But like Fernando Tatis, Jr. is locked up long term. There’s no, like, Harper and Machado coming through the— the pipeline with one exception, and that’s Juan Soto. And I’m curious how he and Scott Boras handle this next winter, because I think that you can spin— Ohtani is going to make more money than God [10:26] no matter what. He wants to play for the Dodgers. He took a deal that made him the highest paid player in baseball, and got him to where he wanted to go, and gave the Dodgers a chance to compete, or at least allowed him to claim that it gives the Dodgers a chance to compete. Maybe that gets converted into an ownership stake later. And so that’s— that’s all well and good for Ohtani, but if Soto gets into free agency, and he comes up against teams that say, “Well, Ohtani is worth 460. You’re not getting more than 460, or you’re not getting more than 46 million a year.” I don’t think Scott Boras is going to take that very well. And I don’t think that the Player’s Union should— should take that well. So I— I— that’s my only real concern with the Ohtani contract, is the idea that being held up publicly or within these negotiations as this is the new thing that we can’t exceed, and that ends up diminishing Soto’s value, which in turn diminishes the value of every free agent for the next 5 to 10 years. And so what— but at the same time, Soto is so young, and he’s got the ultimate bulldog agent, and it would not surprise me in the slightest to see him blow past this and set a new benchmark himself next offseason. So as— as far as Ohtani’s deal goes, I won’t know what to think about in terms of like the state of labor until Soto signs his.
ALEX: Yeah, I don’t know. It was— it was— it was very interesting to witness, but I think I— I kind of fall on the— on the same side of, like, thinking that Soto very well could blow pa— I feel like people— like I forget how young he is. Like he’s—
MIKE: Yeah.
ALEX: What is he, 24? 20—
MIKE: He will hit free agency after this ’25 season. I forget when his birthday is. I don’t have it memorized, like I do trout and Harper, so—
ALEX: Yeah. Yeah, I don’t know. It— it really— it really wouldn’t surprise me about—
MIKE: Harper’s— or sorry. Soto is 25 now, and he’ll be 25 through— he’ll turn 26 during next year’s playoffs.
ALEX: Come on, man. That’s not fair.
MIKE: Yeah. It’s ridiculous.
ALEX: I mean, do you— I— I I feel like there was a lot of sort of speculation that, you know, this was maybe going to come up in the next round of CBA negotiations, right, that they’re going to try and litigate away the ability for players to— to do this sort of thing. And I have— I don’t know why the Players Association would ever come to the table on that sort of thing, because you’re removing the power. But, like, I mean, do you see that as a sort of sticking point? I— years down the road, again, I know it might depend on sort of where things land with Soto. But do you see that coming up at all?
MIKE: I don’t know what the incentive would be, ’cause I— first of all, I’m not really sure which side would want to ban, like, these big, deferred contracts, because apparently, you know, this was something that Ohtani wanted, something that Player’s Union has— has pushed to keep in. And, like, this is a— a horse trading thing, so, you know, whether owners want this or— or the players want, you know, limit on deferrals like that— whichever side wants it is going to have to give up something in order to get it. And I don’t know, I don’t get the sense that this is important enough to either side that— that they would actually make a real change about it. I think— well, all this boils down to is just— it’s the ultimate, like high-level view of— of economic imbalance in sports, which is that particularly in a closed system like— like Major League Baseball where there’s no relegation, when one team is good, the perk— like, of that’s bad, that the Dodgers are good, we have to make them spend less, so the teams that don’t spend as much will be competitive. And, like, first of all, that’s not going to work because part of the reason that Ohtani wanted to go to the Dodgers is they’re so well set up. Like, they— like that— like sort of— they— they spend a lot, they win that sort of— [14:25] that’s chronological I guess, but it’s a good place to work. They have a good coach and they have good player development staff. That’s a nice place to live. Obviously, if all things being [14:34]
BOBBY: Counterpoint. Counterpoint. Counterpoint. Who wants to live in LA? Come on, let’s be— let’s be honest.
MIKE: I mean, I don’t, but like— I— we got— we got so much—
BOBBY: This is an anti-LA podcast, let’s keep it that way, Baumann.
MIKE: It’s— it’s— sorry. It’s a good place for young rich athletes to live.
BOBBY: Okay. Good. Good. Good clarification.
MIKE: So, like if— If I were picking some— you know, any Major League city to live in, like it would be someplace cold and miserable. I don’t— we don’t need any more evidence that I’m wired differently than your average baseball player. But— so the Dodgers would assign them anyway if— if everybody made the same salary is— is my point. And it’s just a— it’s such a— an anti-creative, like really nihilistic way of looking at the world. We have to peg back the teams that are actually pursuing this as a sport, instead of as a real estate scam. So I mean, that’s just really what all this boils down to is— it’s— when fans are saying, “It’s— well, my team didn’t get this flyer, and I’m gonna fill my diaper about it.” And what other owners are— are saying it or people carrying water for owners, it’s much the same sentiment. So I don’t know, I don’t think that really changes anything, the structure, or the steel or— or the dollar amount evolved.
BOBBY: I don’t think it does, either. I— I was always in the camp that this made it— the structure of Ohtani’s deal made it actually easier for any team in MLB to—
MIKE: Yup.
BOBBY: —in good faith, offer it than if they actually had to pay him $70 million per year. And so I don’t understand— just because he happened to land with the Dodgers— I— I suppose that the frustration comes from the fact that they could afford the $70 million per year, and they basically don’t have to give it to him now, and they should have to give it to him, because they have it. I think that that was like the very narrow line that fans were sort of trying to argue or that, like, small market defenders were sort of trying to argue. But I’m— I’m— I’ve remained more fascinated in how this plays out with someone like Juan Soto. I know his name—
MIKE: Yeah.
BOBBY: —keeps coming up, because he’s the next superstar free agent to come up who will get one of these— these 10-plus year contracts most likely if we take the Scott Boras model and we apply it to Juan Soto. But, you know, Boras was very intentional in coming out and saying that the market in his mind is still status quo, and that was the way that he described it.
MIKE: Yes.
BOBBY: And you might say that— I— I thought that that was interesting three-dimensional chess from his perspective, because for him to say the market is status quo would imply that, “Okay. Ohtani isn’t actually making $70 million per year, so I’m not going to try to get 60 for Soto or something like that.” But I think that he was basically trying to unpack the idea that the market is not changed and that deferrals are the expectation now, because that’ll be more harmful to players who don’t want to take deferrals. His clients who don’t want to take deferrals in the long run than just admitting that Ohtani is an outlier and that no other player really, in— in this market, the way that it’s structured, could or should command 70 million average annual value.
MIKE: Yeah. I mean, I think Ohtani— that is close to what Ohtani is actually worth, like $70 million a year.
BOBBY: Agreed. I agree. Yeah.
MIKE: But I think the— the way to look at this and— the way I would look at this is the— the dollar value and the percent that are— the percent that’s deferred, these are canards. This is not the point. The point is the deferrals actually do make the contract worth less to the player for, you know, for practical purposes. It’s why— you know, it’s why they get discounted against the competitive balance tax. And so just don’t look at this as a $700-million contract. Look at this as a $461-million contract. And I think once you do that, it all makes sense. Like, nobody cares about contract structure. Like, if— if it’s a no interest deferral, then that makes— that actually makes the contract worth less, and so the headline figure is big and flashy. And I think— my hope is that that big headline figure, the $700 million, gives Boras more room to maneuver with Soto. But, again, we won’t know until it happens, so I’m— I’m curious to see how that all plays out.
ALEX: No one cares about contract structure, except for maybe the three people sitting on this Zoom right now.
BOBBY: That’s right. And the thousands, and thousands of— droves of—
MIKE: I—
BOBBY: —people out there listening.
MIKE: I’d say—
ALEX: That’s right.
MIKE: —most people care about contract structure work at FanGraphs and I’m very happy that they do, because I’ve had to have so much explained to me over the— the past year.
BOBBY: I— before we— we get too far down the rabbit hole of— I mean, I know deferred— deferred money is like— it was in the news, it’s a recent thing. But before we get too far down the rabbit hole of the— the MLB— the state of labor in— in the bigs, I don’t want to forget about the CBA. So la— the Minor League CBA. So last time we talked, the players had formed union, they had been recognized. They were about to start the process of bargaining. And since then, I think maybe faster than any of us expected, maybe faster than even the players involved, maybe faster than anybody, except a select few people on either side of the table expected, and the Minor League Baseball CBA was agreed to and ratified.
MIKE: I— I lost my shirt in the Effectively Wild predictions game, because I thought this was going to take all season. And— yeah.
BOBBY: I thought it was gonna— yeah, I thought it was gonna take like over a year, you know, based on all of the things that they could have brought to the table and fought over and con tooth and nail and all of the high-powered lawyers on the decide who, you know— were not going to be herding for money, given the fact that the minor leaguers were, you know, now— now part of the MLB Players Association and had all of their resources to fight this— this first contract down to the— down to the wire, but it happened really fast. I— from a 30,000-foot view, everything that’s in the minor league CBA, it’s also— it’s obviously not perfect. No— no CBA is ever perfect. Is it better than, worse than, or about what you expected it to be?
MIKE: I’d say just in terms of the— so I think you have to look at this— this is a common refrain you see from labor people who— like they unionize someplace like a Starbucks or a— a newsroom, or like a tech company, and in order to avoid— in order to undermine the union, the— the company gives everybody a 10% raise. You know, I think— I think Tesla just did that today. And so I think you have to look at those gains, like the housing gains and stuff, the stuff that they got before the actual unionization effort got off the ground. You have to look at that as part of the— this whole process as well, even though that wasn’t the union as such. And so I mean, I’ll just— look, I’ll just say this, like, the minimum salary is— got— got doubled at every level, at least. And so any CBA that doubles your salary, I think you— you know, you have to tip your cap and say, “Well done.” It’s not— it’s not what minor leaguers make in other sports. Now, baseball’s minor leagues are bigger and sort of go deeper than they do in hockey and basketball. But I think it gets them to within striking distance of where you can get— get closer to what— you know, some minor league hockey players or minor league basketball players make. And, you know, obviously, you know, there are things that— that I don’t love about this. I— I think I’m less of a— a— an anti-Minor League contraction hardwired than some people are, but obviously reducing the size of the minor leagues is— is— it’s bad. You know, it’s bad for the— I think it’s bad for the game and— but it’s— I think it’s something that was probably going to happen anyway. And so, you know, I think that’s like the— the big trade-off. So, I don’t know— you get— you can live on some of these salaries now, which you couldn’t before. And I think just that alone is— is a huge one.
ALEX: It is sort of interesting to see MLB sort of— again, with the— you know, with there being a CBA in place, with there being a union in place, them sort of clawing at the— the edges at the things they can take back. You mentioned potential contraction of minor leagues. You know, they reduce the size of the domestic reserve list, as well MLB spent a lot of— a lot of time and energy lobbying Florida politicians this year to, like, exempt minor leaguers from— from minimum wage, right? Obviously, that’s where half of— half of the teams play their— their spring training. And so it— it almost seems like they’re sort of shifting the front a little bit to these sort of legal battles that they can maybe wedge, I don’t know. I’m curious how— how you think that plays into MLB’s strategy going forward now that there’s obviously a framework of, like, you can touch these things, you can’t touch these things.
MIKE: I think having the CBA is a necessary bulwark against this, because I mean, the op— there’s some— so this is not strictly labor-related. It’s a little bit off the beaten path, but when the— the Braves got their— their subsidies from Cobb County from their— for their new stadium in The Battery. It was so unpopular there, the— like, the— the county commissioners who approved the deal got voted out of office, and it was characterized at the time as like a deeply Republican area, like that area is a little more blue— purple to blue now. But it was viewed as like this is the end of the— the stadium financing graft machine. And I think— I don’t want to blame Donald Trump specifically, but I think that— the— the Overton window for corruption has swung back in a big way in the past seven years. And so because of that, it’s so easy for business to— just base it— so to either— you know, through camp— campaign contributions, or just by courting politicians who want to own workers, like that’s— own perhaps in the literal as well as idiomatic sense. You can get so much done if you’re trying to screw your labor force, and so that’s why having this on paper, it’s a— it’s a big deal. And so— and at the same time, like, it makes me wonder what MLB’s endgame is with some— you know, you mentioned Florida— like the— the minimum wage exemption and stuff like that, like, it makes me wonder how productive that’s gonna be.
BOBBY: I think when we— I— it really honestly can’t be overstated how fast this all happened, like how fast the minor league unionization drive happened, the recognition this— the— how fast they started bargaining and how fast they agreed to a contract was actually shocking to me. But when I look at it now, about a year later or a little bit less than a year later, I— I think about it more in the terms of, were working conditions bad enough that the faster they came to any contract would be better than the things that they would have expected to get had they drawn this fight out longer? And I guess when I— when I reflect back on it in that way, for all of the things that— that are in this CBA, for all that you could say about how— if they went on strike, that they probably would have had a lot higher salary minimums. They probably would have made a lot more inroads in terms of long-term sustainability of the minor leagues and— and limiting jobs, and cutting jobs. But would they have been able to organize that given all of the unique challenges that they face being split between Minor League levels or— or— or teams just cutting players for any— no good reason, or all of these things that logistically we talked about made it harder for them to even form a union in the beginning.
MIKE: I’ve— I made this argument on this podcast last year, and you called me a sellout.
BOBBY: Did I— I don’t know that I used the word sellout.
ALEX: Pull out the receipts.
MIKE: You didn’t— you didn’t say sell out, you called me counter—
ALEX: Producer, run the tape.
MIKE: —revolutionary or something [26:29]
BOBBY: No. No. What happened was you called me accelerationist and yourself incrementalist.
MIKE: Yeah.
BOBBY: And then I said, “I think of you as more of the accelerationist.” And you said, “I don’t think that’s true, and I think accelerationist is cooler to be.” So really what happened was you were just telling me I was cool.
MIKE: Well, that certainly wasn’t my intention.
ALEX: You’re talking to someone who listened to this episode, like, an hour ago, so he’s fresh in his mind.
BOBBY: I did, yes. I— I listened to it to refresh what— what we talked about, you know? It— it’s— it’s important to make sure that these are one big thread that we’re weaving. But do you share that perspective then—
MIKE: Yes.
BOBBY: —the— the same perspective that I have, that how fast they got the contract is more beneficial to more human beings in real life than the theoretical future contract that they could have gotten, had they gone on strike or— or drawn this fight out for two years?
MIKE: Yes. And I also don’t think that a— a protracted strike like— I don’t know. We— we talked about this last year, I think. Getting these guys to— to all come together and go on strike, just knowing what that might mean, well, knowing— knowing what missing even a couple months of their Minor League careers might mean for their ability to make, you know, tens, or hundreds of millions of dollars later. It— and so far as— as, like, 90% of these guys will never even reach arbitration. But they all think they’re going to, you know, sign a $50-million contract when they— once they hit the Majors. I just don’t think that that was ev— ever going to happen on an organizational level. And once— once you know that it’s not in your best interest to drag this out, not just for that reason, but because, like you said, the sooner these raises get put into place, the sooner these people’s lives improve immeasurably. So, there’s that. And also, like, I imagine, you know, based on our experience negotiating a collective bargaining agreement, the minor leaguers probably had an easier time getting their emails returned. So— and like everybody who’s working on the CBA is working on it full-time. So MLB slowed down the bargaining dates, going around— around the lockout. That was a tactical maneuver. That wasn’t like a— a—
BOBBY: A practical thing, yeah.
MIKE: —a practical thing. Like it— it wouldn’t actually take them a month in between meetings to actually get their shit together and come— come up with a counterproposal. So I think both sides wanted to make— make a deal—
BOBBY: Money in such a— such a specific amount of time. It’s almost like you— you almost had experienced, but have you wait—
MIKE: I just pull that—
BOBBY: —a month, 30 days or so.
MIKE: No. I mean, I’ve hit myself over the head with a hammer so many times since— since that I’ve—
BOBBY: You’re watching Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, like this seems kind of nice, you know? Not soul crushing at all, this seems preferable way of life.
MIKE: Yeah. You— you’re telling me this is the 5th Annual State of labor in baseball podcasts, when in reality, it’s the 13th, and I just can’t remember the other ones.
BOBBY: We’re holding together a very finite version of reality. It’s all a house of cards. If one of us, like, slips that we’ve been doing—
MIKE: Alex’s hair keeps changing color.
ALEX: Yeah. I— I think they’re in— interesting play— I mean, do you— do you think that like— again, I don’t know how these structures work within Major League Baseball, but like, is it— I mean, I know the answer to this. Is it more work to negotiate two CBAs as well— like, I think— I mean, you’re dealing with two— now two sort of distinct groups with their own unions and their own sort of structures and stuff. I mean, does MLB have to shift its focus at all? Because I know for me, that’d be a lot of plates up in the air.
MIKE: Yeah.
ALEX: I wouldn’t be able— I wouldn’t be able to negotiate one.
MIKE: You and me both. It’s— so I— it is a heavier lift—
BOBBY: Light work. Light work. You can do it, Alex.
MIKE: —just because you’ve got two— just because you’ve got two, like you said, related but distinct unions. But also, like, tons of companies deal with way more unions the— than this within their labor forces. So, like, I don’t know, like hospitals have more than two unions. So it’s—
ALEX: Yeah.
MIKE: It— you just hire a couple extra lawyers, and you make sure that, like, you know, your vice-president of— of HR, or whatever the— the title is— is in contact— you know, constant contact with the union leadership, so you— and also, once you get the first CBA out of the way, everything else that follows is easier, because you’re working on stuff that already exists. So, yes, I think it is a heavier lift, but they just bill more hours to their outside counsel, and everybody’s— everybody’s fine.
BOBBY: You know, it appears that the Major League Baseball CBA ends in 2026, which we know at the end—
MIKE: Yeah.
BOBBY: —of 2026. And the Minor League Baseball CBA runs through 2027. That’s not ideal. I think that they should line up, because a— a collect— any sort of collective action in which you could both do it at the same time would be— it’s hard to quantify how beneficial that would be, especially to the Minor League side, where like if they were going to go on strike, doing it with the— the protection of the Major League Baseball Players also being on strike, and we can bargain these contracts, and we can fight for these principles at the same time. Seems like a sort of thing, that would have been an admirable thing to try to get the CBA into. I guess three years would have been short for a first CBA.
MIKE: Yeah.
BOBBY: I say as someone who is renegotiating a— a three-year CBA. But, like, it—
MIKE: And I’m also not sure why— you know, is there a personal experience that would lead you to believe that, you know, having related unions with the same— you know, the same CBA bargaining— CBA expiration date would give you a stronger negotiating position?
BOBBY: I’m just saying from a— from a macro— from— from someone of the macro— from a macro someone who’s interested in labor perspective. You know, the general strike, it’s common, Mike.
MIKE: I— I know.
BOBBY: We got it all lined up. Everybody just— everybody’s CBA expired at the same time. You know, they should have considered that. That’s just— it’s just bad union bureaucracy, I guess. I mean, it’s probably very hard to get them to even give four years, let alone five.
MIKE: I think five years is— I mean, five years is the— the standard [32:38]
BOBBY: It’s the standard for—
MIKE: Yeah.
BOBBY: Yes.
MIKE: So— and I don’t think— I’m not really sure that either the MLBPA or the league wants to negotiate too at the same time. So the reason— like you said, the reason the general strike and everybody lining up for 2028 is so— it’s such a big deal is because you want to be able to shut down the entire works and exert pressure like on a— like an industry level rather than a company level.
BOBBY: Yes. Yes.
MIKE: And that doesn’t really apply to baseball, because— so I— I keep bringing up the— the US Women’s National Hockey Team strike as like the pinnacle of— of sports labor action in our lifetimes.
BOBBY: Uh-hmm.
MIKE: And the reason that that was so successful is they got to all the potential scabs before USA Hockey did. And having the minor leaguers unionize, having them in the fold, it prevents them from— like, let’s say they want to go replacement players again, like they did in 1995. Where are they going to get him? So just having the— I think having the minor leagues under— under contract while the next— God, I hope there’s not another lockout, but if there is, you know, having them under contract with— when the next CBA comes up, when there’s the next potential for a labor stoppage, I think that provides as much leverage as negotiating two new CBAs at the same time would.
BOBBY: Yeah. Yeah. I think that is largely true, and they’re— the things that they’re fighting for are— are often so different that— I don’t know that there would be one thing across both contracts that— that both bargaining units would be like, “We’re not signing a contract without this in it.” It would have to be much more like a, “We’re not signing our contract until you guys do in order to help you out.” And that— I think that just the—
MIKE: Hmm.
BOBBY: I guess the political machinations of those bargainings are so just in diff— on different planes that—
MIKE: I’d— yeah, I’m skeptical of how altruistic your average big leaguer is toward minor leaguers.
BOBBY: I mean, me too. Big— I mean, big time, as evident by the history of the MLBPA.
MIKE: I— I did have a funny— I did have a funny image while we’re talking about this. Like imagine explaining 2028 and the general strike to, like, Chris Sale.
BOBBY: That’s— that’s— he’ll be pitching for the Braves still then, according to the extension that he just signed.
MIKE: Is that— is it gonna go that long? I thought it was only two years.
BOBBY: I— I actually— I actually don’t know.
MIKE: I 2028 the next— don’t scare me like that.
BOBBY: It’s— it’s— it’s closer than you think, Mike. It’s closer than you think.
MIKE: Just put me in the fucking ground. Jesus.
BOBBY: I would like to ask you about something that I’m— I don’t know how much of an existential threat it is to— to labor in baseball, but it’s certainly of economic concern to the entire baseball industry. And I would like to frame this question through one specific baseball team, and that is the Seattle Mariners who are— are, I would say, not crushing it these days from a financial and operational perspective. Now, Alex, and I spent a— a hilarious amount of time explaining what’s going on with their RSN deal, and them buying the RSN, and all of the distribution of their game a few weeks ago on the podcast. And I— I— I think it was a great conversation. If you didn’t check it out, maybe go back and— and find that. But the Mariners to me right now are— are the perfect example of a team who is an alarming blueprint than other teams will either try to follow or will just grab on to the tale of and cry poor over. So the Mariners’ RSN is not performing as expected, and they are a mid to high market, but obviously, not a market like LA or New York. And they have used this largely as an excuse to not really add to the team at all. And they obviously broke their curse a couple years ago. And since then, the team has gotten 5% to 10% worse and they seem like they’re going in the wrong direction. I’m curious whether or not you think that the Mariners are something of a canary in the coal mine for the next fight. The next industry wide macro-economic fight over how much money is coming into baseball and how that money should be redistributed. We— when we first started doing these episodes, it was amidst what we now can safely call a capital strike.
MIKE: Yeah.
BOBBY: and I’m still not really even sure why they were claiming they had to do that. And now, I just see basically just like a— a febreze version of that same exact argument that the Mariners are trotting out there. So I turn it to you, are the Mariners the canary in the coal mine for what we will be talking about one, two, maybe three years from now on these episodes?
MIKE: Maybe. I think that depends on how in sort of these mid to— to upper mid markets, how the RSN bubble bursts, and what shape that takes, and how they figure out to recoup that— that local broadcast revenue. I don’t know what the Mariners are doing apart from getting cheaper and getting worse. And so like the fact that they’re getting worse while getting cheaper doesn’t bother me that much. It’ll be nice to see Luis Castillo and Julio Rodriguez in the playoffs every year. If— I was gonna say if working for a Mariners fan who— would probably be better for me if they were good, but I’ve seen how— how Meg reacts to—
ALEX: Games with [38:10]
MIKE: —high tension Mariners game, so—
BOBBY: Yeah, exactly.
MIKE: I don’t know. Maybe I’ll be happier if they go 72-90 for the next— next five years. If they’re— they’re making the playoffs every year, I might have to find a new job. But what’s going to happen if they get— if they get cheaper or gonna get worse? Unless they got a lot smarter, which it doesn’t seem like they’re really interested in doing, either. And so it’s annoying— I would say not as annoying as what the Orioles are doing where they’ve— I don’t want to say lucked into, because they did like a lot of— I don’t know, drafting Gunnar Henderson in the second round is like— I don’t know. They should get credit for doing that. But they’re gonna get like three potential MVP level up the middle guys all at the same time, plus a bunch of other regular— you know, plus a bunch of other really good complementary pieces. They won 100 games last year, and they’re doing jack shit with it. They’re wasting it. And, like, I find that a lot more offensive than, I don’t know, the Mariners being the 18th best team in baseball with the 18th highest payroll, or— or wherever they end up. Like, I think they’re a cool team with a cool history and a— like to see their fans have something worth caring about, but they’re suffering their punishment for being run the way they are. And I don’t think that’s inappropriate at all.
ALEX: I mean, how annoying do you think this gets for fan— when— when Bobby and I talked about this a few weeks ago, he— he made a point that was like, you know, fans shouldn’t have to care about this, shouldn’t have to give a shit about RSNs, right? It’s like what— whatever your rights fees are does— does not affect me in— in theory. I mean, I— if the rights fees go up, those— you know, that might get passed down to me and my TV package. But I— I don’t know. With the— there all these sort of moves that are kind of being made in various corners. Diamond Sports is talking with Amazon potentially, right? But Major League Baseball is trying to claw back these rights and maybe create their own platform or work something out with— with Amazon or Apple on their own. I mean— and so like the owners and— and front offices throughout these excuses, right, that say, “Hey, we don’t have this revenue coming in. We can’t spend on the team.” I— that’s— you know, you hear a version of that sort of excuse kind of— kind of every day. I mean, do you think there’s a point at which fans— where it kind of boils over to a point where fans are like, “What the hell is— am I— am I doing? I— I literally cannot watch my favorite baseball team, or— or my favorite hockey team, or my favorite basketball team.” Right? In the case of— of that specific RSN. So I’m— I’m wondering how this— this unfolds in the next couple of years as a— as a— as a consumer, which I know you’re— you’re often thinking about.
MIKE: No. I think that— that’s a good way to put it, because I think fans should care really about two and a half things. And so, like, one is my team good? Is— are they going to be good? And like the half is like, are they going to be interesting? Like, is it gonna be a good experience to watch them? Whether that’s going to the park or— I don’t know. Is it going to be fun? Like, this is an entertainment thing. This is a leisure activity. Like am I getting my— my leisure and by watching them, and following them, caring about them, and spending money on them. And the— the other thing is how annoying and/or expensive is it going to be to see them play. I— those are the only two things that I think fans should care about in terms of these RSN deals. And there are a lot of different ways that this can go. We could— I don’t know if we’re gonna see the dissolution or the reintegration of cable. I know that we’ve talked about that on this podcast more times than I can count.
BOBBY: Legendary stuff.
MIKE: But— but there— there are multiple ways that— I think there are multiple tangible ways for this to go. You know, we’ve seen— I think it’s the Phoenix Suns and the Vegas Golden Knights have done some creative things with their own, like, streaming rights. You know, I think a lot of Mariners fans, but not all, would— if it’s cheap enough, would, you know, pay for like— watch every Mariners game for, I don’t know, 100 bucks a season. I think that probably sells a lot. Or if there’s like a pay-per-view option, you get, you know, a buck a game or something. I think that’s one way it could go. I think we could see renegotiation of streaming pack— packages. I think we could ultimately see the end of blackouts and maybe MLB.TV, you know, picks up some of that slack. I don’t know how this is going to go. I will say that, like, I could see multiple— I could see more than one side of— of— of this issue, because, you know, I subscribed to a lot of streaming services anyway, so like the odd game on Peacock or Apple doesn’t bother me. But for people who, you know, can’t afford to subscribe to anything other than, like, Netflix, like I can— and who want to watch every single game. That’s the other thing. It’s like, I’m not going to watch all 162 games of any one team. You know, I could see why that’s frustrating. And then you look at what MLS did where— like I would watch— I wasn’t a diehard MLS fan, but when they were on ESPN and Fox, like I would— or on local TV here with the union, I would watch a, you know, decent number of games, and then they went exclusive on Apple. Which if you’re a diehard, like that’s great, but I haven’t watched a single MLS game since that— since that happened. So I think you can silo this stuff off, you know—
BOBBY: I thought you were a big for all men content. How are you watching for all mankind without—
MIKE: It’s a separate— it’s a separate pack—
BOBBY: Oh, okay. So you could pay like an additional package?
MIKE: Yeah. If it was just all on Apple, then like I’d watch MLS all the time. But I’m not— I don’t care enough about, ironically, the Philadelphia Union to— like I watch them when they’re in the Champions League, and that’s on— on the cable that I pay for already. So, yeah, I— I think there’s got to be a mix, I think, of— of national local TV and streaming— I don’t know. This is not my— I— I really don’t know enough about the future of streaming media to— to really tell you what the smart play is. But—
BOBBY: Yeah.
MIKE: —whatever they do is going to work for some people, but not for others.
BOBBY: I don’t know— I don’t know that any of us really know enough about the future of streaming media. I don’t think the people who are in charge. I think they might know the least, you know? Like I— I don’t— I don’t trust really David Zaslav’s decisions about what he’s putting on his own streaming service that he— he owns so much of our—
MIKE: He’s— he’s [44:41]
BOBBY: The history of our intellectual property in America.
MIKE: They— so the— so the—
BOBBY: He— he fucked you individually?
MIKE: Yeah. So right as I start this cycling newsletter, I’m gonna plug later, there’s a— there was a streaming service called GCM plus, which show— if you had a VPN, you could see like every big cycling race.
BOBBY: Hmm.
MIKE: And it’s owned by like the Warner Discovery—
BOBBY: Behemoth.
MIKE: —behemoth and they shut it down for no reason.
BOBBY: Trust. We can call it the Warner Discovery Trust. We can just—
MIKE: So now like— I’m like— I was— some of this stuff’s gonna be on Peacock, but we’re— you know we’re gonna keep pirate— we’re gonna go back to the old days of pirating in steephill.tv.
BOBBY: Yeah. Yeah. He— that’s not what you want. But I don’t know that anybody— I don’t know that— part of the— the, I guess, existential fear that I have over this when it comes to the state of labor in baseball is just— it just seems like there’s a lot of little fires in all parts of the consumption of the game. It’s very expensive to go— to watch a game in person. They almost don’t want you to do that at this point. It’s expensive to eat when you’re at that game. It’s expensive to watch the games on TV. It’s confusing to watch the games on TV. You don’t— it’s— it’s inconsistent how you watch the games on TV. And it seems like there’s a lot of little— like I said, little fires cropping up in all different parts of the game and how they monetize it. Now, is it labor side to— is it labor’s problem to deal with that? No, it’s not. It’s— it’s the business’ side to deal with that in capitalism. Like they— they— if they want to monetize it, they need to figure out how to get their revenue streams in order and to continue to make it at least watchable enough that they can extract money from consumers like us, which they’ve done— for all you can say about Major League Baseball owners, they’ve been pretty good at extracting money from their consumers of the history— over the history of the game. I guess I just worry that, like, anytime there’s any turbulence on that side of the baseball economy, it is usually labor who has to solve for it because—
MIKE: Yeah.
BOBBY: —they will get—
MIKE: Or the consumer, some combination of— yeah.
BOBBY: Exactly. And so is this— are all of the sorts of things that they need to triage on that side, are they just gonna be like, “No. You guys— you guys figure it out.” You know, you— or you guys take the brunt of it. And how are we— is that going to become the only thing that we’re talking about on this podcast or in this corner of our little weird internet over the next couple of years is— they’re just— they’re just crying poor all of the time, because of the collapse of streaming, or the consolidation of streaming, or TV doesn’t exist anymore. And who will bear that brunt is, I think, a fascinating question. I have some sneaking suspicions. You know, I don’t think it’s going to be Rob Manfred and his group of cronies.
MIKE: That’s— I think— that I think is where this is going to end up blowing back on labor, because whenever there’s any kind of economic downturn, you know, there’s a— a recession or like a— somewhere some disruption in the supply chain, service gets worse, prices go up, and we pay more. Like consumers pay more for gas, or cars, or, you know, semiconductors or whatever. And when those conditions ease, the prices stay the same. You know, they never go back down to normal. It’s never— there’s never like a temporary price increase. So to your point, what’s going to happen? Let’s just— like, use these— if— if baseball is 100 units, right? And that’s the money that comes into the game, and labor takes 50 and ownership incurs, 30 as costs and— as other costs and has 20 as profit, then— oh, no, I gave myself hard things. 25 and 20 costs and— and profit, so I could do this math in my head. Let’s say the— you know— and— and the— the streaming bubble collapse and— and revenues went down. And instead of 100 units coming in, there was 80 units. Like if labor got 40 and ownership went to 20 costs and 20 profit, that wouldn’t, I don’t know, be bad for everybody, but it will be equitable, or relatively equitable. What’s going to happen is no matter how— how big the— the big number— or how much the big number collapses, ownership is going to want not just 25 in profits, but they want to make their profits grow to 30 or 35 with every deal. And that’s where you get something like the series of lockouts that almost killed the NHL. And so I think baseball is so— there’s so much more institutional inertia involved in baseball than hockey, that I don’t worry that— about— like that kind of real, like, comet that killed the dinosaurs type of thing happening.
BOBBY: Yeah.
MIKE: But it’s the— the first CBA, I don’t know, wouldn’t shock me if we lose like half a season in a lockout. The first CBA after the streaming bubble [49:43] and truly collapses. But on a team by team basis, like the Mariners lose their RSN and, you know, all the Bally teams or whatever, a lot of the— the teams that are most likely to do what you said, already doing it. Like, what the fuck are the Pirates gonna do if they’re not doing it already? Or the A’s, you know? And— or the Reds. Like even the— or the Orioles, or even like— even teams that are good now. Like, how much further can they pull— pull things back? So I think that they’ve gotten so greedy—
BOBBY: Yeah. They got a lot of players on league minimum already, you know? Like there’s not really—
MIKE: I mean, they’ve gotten so greedy, there’s not that much more for them to— or there’s not that much more space for them to go.
ALEX: Yeah. This might be like Galaxy branding it a little bit, but like, is there— in a roundabout ways— you know, any sort of— I guess benefit is the— is the wrong way of putting it. But, like I— what we’ve seen in this is like— what it ultimately does is it starts to pit teams against each other. I mean— I mean, Major League Baseball would love an overarching agreement that, like, everyone is— is happy with, but because everyone’s deals look slightly different and there’s different streams of money coming in, like you have these small market teams that are facing different conditions than— than big market teams. And it does seem over the last few years that we’re seeing maybe more fractures in what has long been a sort of united front on ownership’s side. And we saw that— especially like with regard to the Padres for a couple of years, right, there was— and— and it feels like maybe the— the jets have cooled on that a little bit, because like they— they never got good. But I— I— I don’t know. I wonder if, like, there is a way for labor to sort of take advantage of it in some regard, the— the fact that— that you do have owners who are, like, at their throats— at each other’s throats in some regard. And I— I—
BOBBY: I love we’re having this. I love this. I love this energy. They’re in disarray, we attack. You’re like Napoleon right now.
ALEX: Right.
MIKE: Well, the way you framed is— as like this being a recent crack in the facade, you’re— you’re like if Napoleon was too young to remember the ’90s, is—
ALEX: It’s true.
MIKE: They wanted to break the union and institute a salary cap, and they didn’t. And I think the—
BOBBY: Yeah. They got too greedy.
MIKE: —the psychic damage from that war led to a whole bunch of— of ownership side victories, but I don’t know what the— I don’t know. I’m not fucking Sun Tzu. [52:14] I don’t know exactly what the— you know, the labor relations stratagem is, but I think that there’s a public—
BOBBY: Not yet you’re not. Not— not yet.
MIKE: There’s a public relations wedge that you can drive between these teams, and I think that— I don’t know. I think just the— the sea change in the— the quality of messaging that the union has had between the— the— the ’16 and ’17 CBA and the lockout, and then the minor league unionization effort, I think that they’re getting savvier about how to exploit that. I don’t know if there’s like a— a legal opening, but there’s definitely a public relations opening to— to sort of turn fans against ownership.
BOBBY: Mike, we’re— we’re coming up on an hour here.
MIKE: Yeah.
BOBBY: You— we have long discussed the historic nature of your consumer rants at the ends of these episodes. I don’t know how they began. I don’t even need to go back in, though. This is just— this is oral history at this point. At the end of every state of labor in baseball, you come to us with a rant about day-to-day consumer life, baseball or not, and I— I think that that time has come.
MIKE: When we were texting, trying to schedule this, and as I was forgetting where I was going to be for the two weeks after Christmas and making you guys completely rewrite your calendar, I was— I was actually texting you guys from the airport as I was trying to fly from Philadelphia to Atlanta for Christmas. And I said, “Remind me about the SodaStream water fountain.” So you got—
ALEX: Curse— curse words.
MIKE: Oh, it’s so much worse than you think, Alex. So when I fly, obviously, you can’t take liquid through the— you know, the metal detector. I don’t like drinking a lot of caffeine on a flight, because I like to sleep on planes. So I take an empty water bottle, my plastic $8 Costco water bottle that I carry everywhere. And I get through security, and I fill up at a spigot, and I’m sure that you guys know the water fountains they have in airports, they have them in gyms where they have the— you know the water-to-mouth spigot and they also have the little vertical thing so you can fill up your— your water bottle.
BOBBY: Yeah.
MIKE: That’s like— I remember the first time I saw it. It was like watching the moon landing. It’s one of my favorite inventions. And in Terminal E, where Southwest flies out of Philadelphia.
BOBBY: Wow. We’re dropping names. We’re dropping names.
MIKE: So I— I’ve looked up how long this thing has been here. I— this is according to airportimprovement.com.
BOBBY: Reliable source.
MIKE: As of—
ALEX: That’s where I— that’s where I go as well.
BOBBY: I used to read them daily.
MIKE: As of June 26, SodaStream has replaced several of these water fountains with branded devices that are 14 times the size.
BOBBY: Yeah.
MIKE: They operate on touchscreens. Touchscreens fucking suck. Touchscreen— like there’s nothing wrong with switches and analog. You can’t like— I had to wait like three pee— there was three people deep in this line, because the SodaStream machine— first of all, it would just fit— give you a— a set amount of water, instead of just you putting your bottle under there, and the sensor reading it, and filling it up until you took it fucking away. And so you had to, like, tap the fucking thing three times in order to get your full water bottle, and the big like—this— this big, branded monstrosity that sticks all the way out into the thoroughfare, which the Philadelphia Airports, basically the Hobbesian state of nature anyway. So that’s great for traffic. And the big innovation that it has, after making things worse and advertising the fucking apartheid company, it— you know, the— like one of the six companies that’s actually on the BDS list. Replacing our— our public utility, our very God-given water, our human right with fucking SodaStream. It says you can have still or sparkling, great, and six flavors. Who fucking wants flavored water as you’re about to get on an airplane where you’re just trying to take water with you, so you don’t— don’t get dried out in the desiccated recycle there? That means you can’t taste anything anyway. It’s privatizing and making things worse, making everything it touches worse in the serve— in the service of geopolitical evil. I could not think of a better illustration for what ails American society in 2023/24 than the SodaStream machine at the Philadelphia International Airport.
ALEX: I— I have to ask, because I’m on pepsicopartners.com, which I guess owns SodaStream, I don’t know.
BOBBY: Shocking. Shocking. I’m so surprised—
ALEX: Yeah.
BOBBY: —that one of the big companies acquired SodaStream.
ALEX: Did you download the app? Because I— I—
MIKE: Yeah, I download the app [57:11]
ALEX: —I hear there’s a company— yeah.
MIKE: —what it means, that was my mistake, Alex. I didn’t download the app. Maybe it would’ve filled up my water bottle—
ALEX: It’s a connected ecosystem.
MIKE: —maybe it would have improved upon the push this button and water tech— water comes out technology. It’s been around for 150 years. The Romans are laughing at us.
BOBBY: That is actually true. That is actually true. They’re like, “All they can do is talk about how much we think about—”
MIKE: Oh, the little— the little bubble water machines. Look at these soft, decadent people. You’d think they’ve evolved beyond the little lever that makes water come out of the hole. It’s all I want.
BOBBY: Aqueduct.
MIKE: It’s— all I want is literal water, the literal sustenance of life without having to navigate through fucking Google Play at the airport while 300 angry guys named Frank are lined up behind me.
BOBBY: I have experienced SodaStream at airports in San Francisco. It’s— it’s horrible. It’s horrible. You’re right. I completely agree. Why put a touchscreen where a touchscreen doesn’t belong? I completely agree. I don’t want carbonated water. I just want cold water. Just cold water.
MIKE: I’d settle for lukewarm water that came from a public utility.
ALEX: What I was— what I thought you were gonna say, Bobby, because I— I’ve also been through the San Francisco Airport many times, and what they have is— I haven’t seen the SodaStreams, but they have like just different water dispensers with, like, a sensor on the side.
BOBBY: Yeah.
ALEX: So you put your water bottle and—
BOBBY: And then you put your hand—
ALEX: —and then you— and then you hold your hand up to the side.
BOBBY: Yeah.
ALEX: —and it recognizes that your hand is there, and dispenses water. And every single person who walks up to it, puts their water bottle in, and then takes it away, and then puts it back, and then looks around to the sides, and then looks to see what the other person is doing next to them, and looks for a button. And it’s miserable.
BOBBY: I gotta say, this is— this is— we’re overengineering these days.
MIKE: Yes.
BOBBY: I know that this has been true for a long time and this has been at the center of many consumer rant by Michael Baumann trademark. However, this kind of reminds me of how yesterday— I’m— I’m in the city of Los Angeles right now for work. And yesterday, the Uber I called, you don’t get to control the make of the car that comes when you call Uber. You don’t. If you could, I would choose never to ride in the Tesla. Unfortunately, I have been in the back of a handful of Teslas because of the Uber Corporation. And every time I’m, like, looking for the fucking button to press on how to get out of the fucking car, how about just a handle? What was wrong with the handle where I can see the handle? I got to press a button to, like, spring load open the door? What if we didn’t do that? What if we didn’t—
MIKE: It’s this— the fact that all these companies are— are run by and for people who are— like, they’re money mover around people.
BOBBY: Yeah.
MIKE: They— they don’t make, they don’t build, because if they were engineers or artists, and actually created something, they would know how— they would know anything about how they— how the stuff that they’re trying to sell actually works and what it’s supposed to do. And our society is increasingly built not to work. It’s built to—
BOBBY: Decay.
MIKE: —to— to decay, to have planned obsolescence to—
BOBBY: Yes.
MIKE: —frustrate public trust in public institutions. And— like, oh, the government’s not going to give you water at the airport anymore.
BOBBY: So you— so— so you have to buy a smart water at the Hudson News?
MIKE: I wonder if that’s where this is gonna go. Like, how long until—
BOBBY: I— I— I mean—
MIKE: —until you can’t get a water fountain [1:00:41]
BOBBY: Without downloading an app and signing for an email and username.
ALEX: Right. Un— un— unlock your water by— by tweeting #SodaStream.
BOBBY: Oh, my God. Oh, my God. I— I have a— I have a follow-up consumer rant, and I actually have one more question to ask you about the state of labor in baseball, but we’re gonna do that on— on the Patreon feed, if that’s alright with you guys? So we’re going to stop down here. So Baumann, I’m gonna give you a chance—
MIKE: Oh, before you go to Patreon, can I plug my— yeah.
BOBBY: Yes, to plug your newsletter, please?
MIKE: Yes. So before we go to the thing that you guys have to pay for the listeners, I’m going to ask you to pay for something else. I’ve started a cycling newsletter called Wheelysports, it’s on Substack. You go to wheelysports.substack.com. It comes out twice a week. I’ll be covering road cycling, so the Tour de France and everything involved in, you know, the dozens of other races that happen throughout the season. Cycling, to me, is very much like baseball and it’s a sport with a proud literary tradition that takes for fucking ever to— to resolve, and it’s mostly about sitting around waiting for stuff to go wrong. And so it’s— I know— you know, you guys know Jake Mintz, he’s a big cycling person. He and I bonded over—
BOBBY: Who’s that? Who? Who? Who? Who’s that?
MIKE: Some Zach Kram’s college classmate. I don’t know if you met him. But we bonded over— over this on— you know, the sort of the similarities between cycling and baseball. So wheelysports.substack.com. It’s $5 a month or $50 a year to read, and I would very much appreciate you guys’ support. Also, sign up for— for FanGraphs memberships. You get all sorts of perks, no ads, stuff like that. That’s everything I had to plug.
BOBBY: Mike, if you could just— just not listen to what I’m about to say, because I hate to compliment you while you’re here, but go sign up for Mike’s cycling newsletter. For my money, one of the best writers on the internet still writing. Everybody else has been driven out of this profession by the vagaries of the world, but Mike is still trudging along, and I enjoy reading everything he writes. I have never regretted it. So go— go check that out.
MIKE: Oh, well, you want to know what the— actually, as we— as we speak right now, the most recent post on the newsletter is 2,600 words about what a bad idea it is for the top teams in cycling to try to upset the structure of the sport to court American venture capital investment. So this is [1:03:04]
BOBBY: Perfect.
ALEX: Oh, my God.
BOBBY: Perfect.
ALEX: Oh, my God.
BOBBY: Perfect.
MIKE: If you like this, you will like that.
BOBBY: It’s all one story, baby. It’s all one take. It’s all the same. Michael Baumann, thank you very much. We— we really appreciate your time.
MIKE: My pleasure
SPEAKER 4: So much stimulus. And at the shopping epicenter. I have an agoraphobic fit. So buy a fountain soda, put some sugar on my tongue. I’ll wake and write some songs with no soul.
With no soul.
ALEX RODRIGUEZ: Hello, everybody. I’m Alex Rodriguez. Tipping Pitches. Tipping Pitches. This is the one that I love the most. Tipping Pitches. So, we’ll see you next week. See ya!
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